Defendants appealed the order from the Superior Court of Santa Clara County (California) denying their petition to compel arbitration of three causes of action in plaintiff's lawsuit for breach of contract and trademark and trade dress dilution pursuant to Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 14330.
Plaintiff football club brought an action against defendants, a football league, its clubs, and associated persons and entities, for various causes of action associated with defendants' alleged abuse of power, mismanagement, and favoritism. Defendants sought to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration agreement. The trial court denied defendants' motion with respect to three causes of action, and the court affirmed the trial court's order.class action attorney Plaintiff's first cause of action could not be arbitrated because it was a claim against defendant merchandising corporation alone, and this defendant had not been a moving party before the trial court. Thus, defendant merchandising corporation lacked standing to argue that plaintiff's first cause of action was subject to the arbitration agreement. Plaintiff's second and third causes of action could not be arbitrated because these causes of action sought injunctive relief, and a private arbitrator had no power to grant injunctive relief.
The court affirmed the trial court's order because defendant merchandising corporation lacked standing to argue that plaintiff's first cause of action was subject to the arbitration agreement and because plaintiffs' other two causes of action sought injunctive relief and, therefore, could not be arbitrated.
Appellant California Horse Racing Board (board) challenged the order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) to grant a writ of mandate to respondent employees after appellant board revoked the license of appellant employee and respondents for wagering, Cal. Code Regs. tit. IV, § 1969, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 19590, 19593, 19595. Appellant employee challenged the superior court's order to deny his petition for writ of mandate.
Appellant California Horse Racing Board (board) revoked the licenses of appellant employee and respondent employees for wagering on races, Cal. Code Regs. tit. IV, § 1969, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 19590, 19593, 19595. The superior court granted a writ of mandate to respondents but denied a writ of mandate to appellant employee, finding that "wager" within § 1969 did not encompass placing bets for others by delivering them to the pari-mutuel window. Appellants sought review. The court reversed the judgment granting the writ of mandate to respondents and affirmed the judgment denying the writ of mandate to appellant employee. The court found that the common usage of "wager" meant one's own funds or the funds of another, and that appellant board did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant employee's license, stayed with one year's probation. The court held that appellant employee was not denied equal protection of the laws, U.S. Const. amend. XIV, because other employees who bet were not caught, holding that appellant employee was not purposefully singled out for prosecution of the basis of an invidious criterion such as race or creed.
The court reversed the judgment of the superior court to grant a writ of mandate to respondent employees whose licenses were suspended for wagering on horse races, and affirmed the judgment denying appellant employee's petition for writ of mandate. The court held that "wagering" included placing bets for others, and that appellant employee was not singled out for prosecution in violation of the equal protection of the laws.
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